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This study investigates whether dismissal threat imposed by clients jeopardizes 
auditor independence, where auditor independence is surrogated by auditor's 
propensity to issue nonstandard audit opinions, and the determinants of 
dismissal threat. We use an auditor switch model to predict the unobserved 
switches clients would have made had they received opposite audit opinions 
and we test their effect on audit opinions. We classify a nonstandard audit 
opinion as referring (1) other auditor and (2) going concern problems. The 
results show that there is a significantly negative association between 
nonstandard audit opinion and dismissal threat by clients unwilling to receive 
an audit opinion modified for referring other auditor. This implies auditor 
independence would be impaired by dismissal threat about other auditor. 
Furthermore, the results of the determinants of dismissal threat show that 
auditor independence would be more severely impaired in the early years of 
auditor tenure. On the other hand, there is a significantly positive association 
between nonstandard audit opinion and dismissal threat by clients unwilling to 
receive an audit opinion modified for going concern problems. This implies 
auditor independence does not affected by dismissal threat about going concern. 
Furthermore, the success probability of dismissal threat about going concern 
would be increased by large clients and decreased by industry specialist. The 
difference between these two inappropriate audit opinions depends on legal 
liability. Hence, market-based incentives, such as loss of reputation and 





Key words：Dismissal threat; Auditor switch; Audit opinion; Auditor  
           independence 
 
 
